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The Split of Reason and the Postcolonial Backlash
The colonial as well as the Cold War divides Orient/Occident or East/West are ex-
amples of the Split of Reason, which was classically paradigmatised in Western
thought by Kant as “theoretical” and “practical” reason. The split of reason can take
different twists and refer to different contents. Some non-dualist Indian schools of
thought, as well as Taoism, on the other hand, have theorised preventively ways to
overcome the divide, sensing that what can be split, might also, alternatively, be
shared or put in common. Splitting and sharing (in only one French word: le part-
age), so, come together/separately as two sides of a coin and are a major feature of
reasoning as a process: as parting and partaking. There are instances of divided reas-
on and of separated memories as (seemingly and at least temporarily)  definitive
everywhere: the memory of the victors and that of the defeated are often irremediably
incompatible, in that they are usually unable to reconstruct a common, shared, past.
The fact is that memory itself takes part in the past event in order to reinterpret it for
the future; also, “memory is itself a historic fact producing other facts”
1. The narrat-
ive on the past erases important alternative histories from the horizon of imaginable
possibilities. This is how history becomes closed, monolithic and normative. Coloni-
alist history obliterates any of the other imaginable scripts but the one favouring the
dominant history. Post-socialist “restoration” by ethnocracies in East-European his-
tory removes willingly 50 or 70 years of real life history of a population, creating
new selective “collective” memories in view of the new nationalist projects. No com-
mon history is recognised any more
2. As the adherence to Europe of ten new mem-
bers is celebrated, every journalist seems to now locate the infamous Iron Curtain
between Slovenia (then Yugoslavia) and the West, forgetting that Yugoslavia was
open and not a member of the Soviet block.
1 Alessandro Portelli, L’ordine è già stato eseguito, Rome, Donzelli 2001, p. 436. Cf. Giovanno Con-
tini, Silvia Paggi (eds.), Storia e memoria di un massacro ordinario. La memoria divisa, Civitella
della Chiana 29 giugno 1944-1994, Rome, Manifestolibri 1994.
2 Močnik, “East!”, in New Moment, n° 20, 2002, East Art Map – A Reconstruction of the History of
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Modernity came to Third World countries through colonial brutality. The rapid
changes brought about through the French Revolution in the West provoked, within
the revolutionary idea itself, paradoxically, a reaction in slowing down and enhancing
a conservative process and “traditional” societies
3. It only intensified colonising. The
latter supposed and enhanced an irreparable civilisational fissure East-West, later
South-North. This cleavage is still the basis not only of colonialist or Cold War
knowledge, but also of a part of Cultural Studies. Colonialism and Orientalism have
been the framework for any other contents. A symptom could probably be seen in
those European countries that were not historically part of the colonial project, East-
European currents of thought ignoring the colonial fact, even in the “Socialist” sense
as subsidising underdeveloped regions. After the Cold War,  some pauperised
European formerly socialist countries rapidly became Third World.
Post-colonial studies (stemming from Cultural studies), Subaltern Studies, Dalit stud-
ies propose to question “from below” and to reinterpret South-South colonial history,
that of oppressed “races”, indigenous peoples, peasants, ethnicities, downtrodden
groups etc. They claim intervention (though fatally limited to university, forgetting
the “physical nature of colonial reality and the physicality of the response”
4). Subal-
tern Studies marks, over languages (leaving French out though referring to “French
Theory”), a certain exhaustion due to the absence of political projects and to its in-
spiration being both revolutionary and liberal. 
There have been roughly 3 kinds of more or less sovereign  states in Modernity: the
Welfare (Capitalist) state, the post-Colonial state as its “periphery” (mainly produced
by Capitalism, but also producing Capitalism in the Centre) broadly called the Third
World, and the State-Socialism state. All can be said national states. The 3-fold blue-
print is indeed the weakest in the examples from the Third World, which has many
shapes that are difficult to gather under one mould. All three types of state have
failed, and it is the Liberal (Capitalist) state with liberal economic policy that is
today’s general tendency. The Welfare aspect and the Social-economic aspect failed
in their purposes – Welfare and Social-economic benefits. The post-Colonial state
(where the state itself is imposed by the West), which was meant to be non-racist,
secular or at least trans-religious, usually took after one of the two models economic-
ally, or a combination. It is usually considered that the post-Colonial state and the So-
cialist state both failed not only economically and systemically, but also and above all
politically, while credit for political democracy is still given to the former Welfare
and now more-and-more Liberal state : formal “democratic” requirements are sup-
posed to be met here. It should be added that these (free elections, mainly) are not
only linked in their origin to the Welfare and also to the Liberal type of state, but are
now also supposed to be universal. Not surprising therefore that formal political
democracy should find itself on the side of the “historic winner” of this portion of the
3 Vasant Kaiwar & Sucheta Mazumdar (eds.), The Antinomies of Modernit. Essays on Race, Orient,
Nation, Duke University Press 2003, p. 271.
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History Game. Modernity was not equally kind to all, and only one pattern – Western
Enlightenment - was recognised as rational and good for all (universal). In this per-
spective, colonising & occupying foreign territories was seen as civilising, and those
territories as empty. Sovereignty is however claimed by all.
The three collapses differ too: in the European Union we live within Welfare States
that are rapidly abdicating every aspect of Welfare and are heading towards the liber-
al model; most of the East-European Socialist states have ducked overnight into the
liberal model forgetting about Welfare as a possible intermediary between Socialist
and Liberal economy. Ethnocracies, newly and proudly capitalist and neo-liberal,
have failed in the sense that they gave up former social and collective policies in fa-
vour of individualism and primary accumulation, leaving jobless populations who
may have been politically unfree during Socialism, but were at least used to full em-
ployment, free education, health & social insurance. The Welfare and the Socialist
state actually failed over comparable long-term projects related to social standards.
They also failed in securing secularism. Secularism & the type of welfare and eco-
nomy are fatally linked. The third kind of state, Post-colonial & independent (though
imported), failed in all that as well (while having those objectives rather as ideals
than as functioning policies – whether Welfare or Socialism) and, moreover, it abor-
ted in its non-racial secular political projects while alternative histories (Samaddar)
remain incomplete. If the (nation) state failed universally, we might well look up for
other forms of socialisation and of collectivity than the nation and than community,
as well as for other continuities (Clavero).
Let’s not forget that 1492, one of the first landmarks of Modernity, was both the year
of the conquest of the Americas and of the fall or of the Reconquista of Granada,
both of inner and outer ethnic cleansing
5 of the nation state; that the national state
was a colonial state
6 and is now a securitarian state, that colonialism was the very
form of Western Modernity
7, that the French Revolution itself was colonial, that the
leader of the first Black revolutionary independence movement, Toussaint Louver-
ture (Haiti), died in a French prison though inspired by the French Revolution, and
that the securitarian state.
5 Klaus Theweleit, Männerphantasien, 1-2, Verlag Roter Stern, Frankfurt a.M./Basel 1977, 1978 (3e
edition); Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms, Verso, London 2002.
6 Kristeva, Julia, Etrangers à nous-mêmes, Paris, Fayard 1988.
7 Gilroy, Paul, The Black Atlantic. Modernity and Double Consciousness, Verso 1993.Ivekovic: The Split of Reason and the Postcolonial Backlash, 4
A linguistic digression
In English, Post-colonial studies are imbedded through Cultural Studies – often in or
from former colonies - in a globalised language, having passed through some USA
academia. There is no comparable situation for French. Since in France there are no
departments of Cultural Studies etc. and since the colonial memory is erased, they are
not being constructed and identified as a discipline. Post-colonial studies are easier to
pass on in Spanish or Portuguese, especially the former, over Latin America and Jur-
idical studies stemming sometimes from Spain itself
8. There has certainly been no
public debate in France about the colonial past (and present) or responsibilities re-
lated to it, though that may soon start and introduce a much belated and possibly
painful catharsis. This unfolding, deeply related to the colonial past, to immigration
as well as to the recent history of Europe’s division, is likely to be enhanced by
Europe’s construction. No decolonisation of France comparable to the de-nazifica-
tion of Germany has taken place yet after the defeats of 1954 or 1962, no political
humiliation due to the French role in history. Soldiers from the Vietnam war have
been decorated by Chirac in May 2004 for the 50
th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu, and
it is not even officially acknowledged that this was a military and moral defeat. I
would like to rely on the authority of B. Clavero again in saying that alas Europe is
being established upon its colonial heritage still unremoved and uncriticized: 
“Let us say simply that (colonialism) is the presumption of supremacy and the exer-
cise of dominance of some peoples over others. (…) Let us not forget that, historic-
ally, constitutionalism has not been very democratic and that, in fact, it coexisted for
quite a long time with colonialism. (…)
“Between a clearly articulated pre-constitutionalism and a relative post-colonialism,
let us be vigilant. […] (The Chart of Rights, “la Carta de Derechos”) […] is historic-
ally loaded with the representation of Europe, since antiquity, as the (entity that)
gives birth to, promotes, transmits and spreads civilization in the singular. All the
cultural heritage of Europe, including the religious heritage, pursues and covers the
objective of a civilization with a universal value and aimed at humanity as a whole.
[…] Universal values should, of course, be promoted, if those are values of liberty;
yet, what is being considered here is not a constitution for humanity, in spite of the
fact that Europe seems to consider itself enabled for an undertaking of such a mag-
nitude. As to the more humble goal of constituting itself, why does it require and why
does it resort to such a preaching of universality – furthermore, by using terms of a
registry of property? If it is trying to protect itself with disproportion, we cannot but
remain concerned. Is it not the manifestation of remains of colonialism or, at least, of
what such remains carry in terms of supremacist pride and conviction as to the singu-
larity of civilization? Is it not a sketch of a colonial script for a universal history in
which Europe would presume itself as the virtualising agent, if not the generator of
humanity in freedom? If such is the case, let us warn immediately that the awareness
8 Clavero, Bartolomé, Genocidio y Justicia. La Destruccion de las Indias, ayer y hoy,  Marcial Pons
Ediciones, Madrid 2002.Ivekovic: The Split of Reason and the Postcolonial Backlash, 5
is missing (la conciencia falta). The preamble still assumes that such a history is the
history of human civilization and not of European colonialism”
9. So much for the
Constitution to be.
One might note that no conclusive debate on colonialism ever took place in Great
Britain either and that it may even be more unlikely there. The two cases of Great
Britain and France may also help us understand where Central Europe, Eastern
Europe
10 and people who do not traditionally belong directly to colonial history (but
do somehow fit, with an “a posteriori effect”, in other people’s colonial past and an
own cultural colonial history, together with a long history of imperial occupation of
neighbouring lands) - fit into the story.
The two countries we might introduce here are India, an indirect rule colony, not a
settler’s but a “private” colonisation
11 at first, a Western type of “democracy” at inde-
pendence, and Algeria, a settler’s colony with a glorious revolution that was alas be-
trayed by its own children (for all sorts of internal and external reasons) and gave rise
to an authoritarian non-democracy. Unlike India, there was no public debate in Al-
geria either, the discourse on colonialism, though existing, had one official form after
independence. One of the reasons why the United Kingdom was lucky to escape
without any relevant public debate about its colonialism was that a powerful Indian
intelligentsia (GB had formed elites in India, which France never did to that extent in
Algeria; moreover, the FLN
* decimated its own intellectual and revolutionary elite at
the very beginning of the freedom fight
12) took hold of the topic. Excellent Indian
scholars, historians, feminists studied that colonialism, its developments and after-
maths (critical not only of British rule but also of Indian independence), within a tol-
erant public space and in a global language (with the obvious disadvantages, some
advantages too): the debate spread directly over the world thanks to that language and
was relayed in the academic ghettoes in the US. This defused the necessity for the de-
bate to burst out within Great Britain itself, and they got away with it.
France wasn’t lucky to have its own critics and interlocutors in Algeria talk to French
intellectuals on an equal footing – the very conditions of the Algerian liberation war
were so harsh and the independence so dearly paid in lives that there was no scope
for a friendly public chat. The indirect rule in India had formed a powerful intelli-
gentsia (with a local middle class). No such thing in Algeria where, due to the brutal-
9 Clavero, “Europa hoy en la encrucijada preconstitucional y postcolonial o de la provocación cruzada
entre derecho e historia”, (manuscript) paper at jornadas sobre Una Constitución para los Ciudada-
nos de Europa, Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Sevilla 23-24 October 2003. Translated
from the Spanish by Goran Fejic. Clavero examines the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe and The Preamble to the Chart of Fundamental Rights of the Convention of 2000 (la Carta
de Derechos). Further in his paper he compares the statements of intention of the departments of Law
and of History-and-Civilization at the European University Institute in Fiesole, Italy.
10 As Birgit Wagner shows too in “Postcolonial Studies für den Europäischen Raum. Einige Prämissen
und ein Fallbeispiel” in www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/theorie
11 Term by Mohamed Harbi, “L’Algérie en perspectives”, in: M. Harbi, Benjamin Stora (dir..), La
Guerre d’Algérie 1954-2004. La fin d’une amnésie, Laffont, Paris 2004, p. 36.
*  Front de Libération Nationale, in independent Algeria to become the one party.
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ity of the war, no intermediary or neutral shared public space between the two coun-
tries, colonized and colonizing, was left, while for India and GB, English played that
role. After a long sequence of one party rule, Algeria capsized into internal violence
in 1991 (when the Islamists would have won the elections but were not allowed to
power by the military), which all prevented a softer development comparable to the
one of India and GB (though the latter relationship, due to the globality of the lan-
guage, was at the same time displaced). There are, of course, Algerian intellectuals
and French scholars doing and exchanging excellent work, but it didn’t make a
school: after all, Frantz Fanon was there (famous in the sixties and forgotten since)
and today Mohamed Harbi, Daho Djerbal and others. The language did the differ-
ence. Besides Algeria introducing massive Arabisation (with its advantages and dis-
advantages) and partly loosing the colonial language in education, French is not a
global world language. Facing the French, there weren’t former colonials criticising
them in their own language as a world language, which delayed but never defused or
displaced the conflict or a possible outburst, which may still come. In order for a dis-
cipline to be identified, you also need to have it surge out in some kind of opposition,
response or to institutionalise.
No-one has access to reason as whole
13: there is no such thing as the whole of Reas-
on, or Reason as a whole, or the Totality of reason. (Though there are cases of such
pretence, and we are just now living through one in the USA fundamentalist cru-
sade.) Reason is patched up of disconnected bits and pieces that reside at different
addresses. It is always partial, in all senses. Being shared is its way of being. Yet
there are situations of temporary undecidability which are the possibility though not
fatality of extreme brutality or of physical violence. Such situations can be described,
at the level of individual or collective subjectivity, as an absence of agency, as de-
empowerment. R. Konstantinovic has called such states of mind palanka
14.
13 The following part of the paper draws on an extended, more elaborate version prepared for the con-
ference « Cultural Diversity, Globalisation & Globalisations » under the title « The Liberal Totalit-
arian System and Gender », Paris, June 4-6, 2003, see www.mondialisations.org. It was also used in
my paper for the Dignity Forum within the World Social Forum, Mumbai 2004: “The Veil in
France : Secularism, Nation, Women” in Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, March 13, 2004.
http://www.epw.org.in/showArticles.php?root=2004&leaf=03&filename=6943&filetype=html
14 Radomir Konstantinovic, Filozofija palanke, Nolit, Beograd 1981, 2nd ed.; see by the same author:
“Sur le nazisme serbe”, in Lignes 06, 2001, pp. 53-75, tr. by R. Ivekovic; “Sur le style du bourg”, in
Transeuropéennes 21, 2001, pp. 129-139, tr. by R. Ivekovic; “Samuel Beckett, Ne rien céder à la
traduction/Yield Nothing to Translation”, in Transeuropéennes 22, 2002, pp.187-199, tr. by Mireille
Robin & Natasa Ilic (bilingual, Fr. & Eng.); R. Ivekovic, Autopsie des Balkans. Ein psychopoli-
tischer Essay, Droschl : Graz 2001. The central concept of palanka (literally “small town” or
“province”) denotes a state of mind rather than a location, in the sense of “spirit” or rather of
“spectre”. It means an incomplete integration of a still communal and perhaps partly even rural soci-
ety in transition, whose contradictions - face to face with modernity - may, but need not, lead to vi-
olence. It denotes the always possible totalitarianism, a state of latent fascism of which everyone is
capable and that is never historically overcome. Relapses are possible at any stage, as recent events
in many parts of the world have shown (take the Balkans; the long march of racist and rightist ideas
in the way Europe is being institutionalised; the “axis of evil” concepts; Rwanda, etc.). This type of
society (palanka), of hesitation about Modernity, is possible anywhere, and is not limited to (post)
colonialism or (post)socialism, but is known to late capitalism too.Ivekovic: The Split of Reason and the Postcolonial Backlash, 7
In the case of France, it is laïcité (“secularism” – though the histories of the two con-
cepts differ) that has to be re-imagined as well as the universal. Laïcité was the basis
of equality (neutrality of the state) in founding the metropolitan-colonial centre of the
French republic, but was the very basis and principle of inequality in the colonies,
which were excluded from constitutional considerations. To the effect of the colonial
divide & division of reason, a “nation”, claims an imaginary common origin and op-
erates a backward time-appropriation. It adopts a vertical and patriarchal
15, hierarch-
ical form. It needs subalterns, women, the colonised, slaves and other pariahs, as well
as a secularism imposed starting from a non-recognised monotheism. Secularism
pretends to neutrality and sweeps away alternative discourses without appearing to be
eliminating them forcefully. So the subordinations of some will have been the condi-
tion of the integration of others. Today we have reached the limits of laïcité and secu-
larism everywhere
16. It is now the leading subject that will have to de-identify. It has
to give up some of its authority and normativity in order to share it. I am here plead-
ing for de-identification. Within a configuration of the universal seen as a rapport
rather than as the supreme office, the autonomy of the subject may be complex, rela-
tional, relative, but saved. A nación could then be composed of different pueblos
17.
It is necessary to recognise the theological origin of state secularism (and of laïcité)
inasmuch they are the secularisation of a divine concept - sovereignty itself
18. This
allows to better understand why “laicisation” doesn’t always give the expected res-
ults
19: whereas universal projects (such as the “republic”, “democracy”) have been
de-legitimised with utopias
20, particularistic (communitarian) claims are more and
more insistent as alternative, and are supported by the general condescendence to cul-
tural, religious etc. essentialisms, though they may also be expressions of oppression.
There are no cultural differences, no sexes or genders outside society, outside the
community, or apart from / without language. And of course, apart from the state.
The ever new forms of partition, of political and emotional demobilisation and of di-
vision are  supported by the founding rift of reason (which they reinforce), from
15 « Patriarchy » is a general hierarchy concerning generations, classes and gender inequality (not
“différence”!). According to some authors who reduce it to mere “gender difference”, patriarchy
would be an outdated concept, while gender inequality would be a purely modern phenomenon in
the sense of homogenising women as a group for the first time in history, and thus not any older than
geographic colonisation itself. 
16 The French debate about the “Islamic veil” and the law on laïcité shows it, cf.: “The Veil in
France”, op. cit.
17 José M Valdés, “HOW CAN A MODERN HISTORY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY MAKE SENSE? On Nation, Iden-
tity, and Territories in the Making of Spain” (manuscript).
18 Roberto Esposito, Communitas. Origine e destino della comunità, Einaudi, Torino 1998 ; Immuni-
tas. Protezione e negazione della vita, Torino: Einaudi 2002; Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism
and Its Critics, OUP India, Delhi 1998; Carl Schmitt, Le Léviathan dans la doctrine de l’Etat de
Thomas Hobbes. Sens et échec d’un symbole politique, traduit de l’allemand par Denis Tirerweiler,
préface d’Etienne Balibar, Seuil, 2002 ; Giorgio Agamben,  Homo sacer, traduit par Marlène Raiola,
Seuil, Paris 2002.
19 Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and Its Critics,  op.cit.
20 Generally speaking, it is thought that the “end of master discourses”, the end of hope in a transcend-
ence or of awaiting a universal solution (or one through the universal) is also the end of utopia as
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which they gather their further divisive, normative and excluding efficiency. This is
why it is necessary to be thinking the new political subjects, those that outgrow both
the reductive language of citizenship, as well as the depoliticised conceptualisation of
governmentality
21. Violence as depolitisation would somehow have its origin in re-
fusing the fact that life itself (as well as culture) is always owed to the other
22. In this
sense self-generation, which is at the basis of the idea of nation is also potentially
(virtually) violent to others and derivatively suicidal. Generation is itself a partition-
ing.
Partitions of states, whether started or accomplished, produce apatrids, the non-docu-
mented persons, people without right to the law (Hannah Arendt), forced migrants,
deported and refugees, both internal and external, that largely outgrow, nowadays,
the definition of the Geneva Convention of 1951 (UN) : at least on political refugees
rights, on their right to non-refoulement, the Convention is today outdated
23, while
the distinction between political and economic emigration becomes undecidable.
Europe under construction has produced its own « nostalgic » of partitioned countries
such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, sometimes even the Soviet Union (in-
comparable cases, it is true). The apparent nostalgia for that period is only a regret for
peace lost since and for a mixed society, and not an aspiration for the dictatorial re-
gime. Once the independence legitimating of the latter exhausted, the equilibrium of
peace crumbled. The « nostalgia » in question, denounced by various nationalists,
had also been a resistance. But the processes nowadays under way, that the « nostal-
gic » themselves are not always able to grasp because their own lives may be at stake,
are not those same nationalisms, fundamentalisms, ethnocracies being established,
but rather the becoming of Europe itself and the new configuration of the planet
(globalisation) of which they are a portion.
The intermediary ethnocracies that ruined our lives may well have been just second-
ary historic occurrences. Nationalism etc. will after all have been bloody and obnu-
bilating episodes, incidents of transition – towards new integrations and the new lib-
eral world order. The question is then that of Europe. These new nationalisms and
fundamentalisms, communalisms, while bringing violence - also homogenise – and
seem in that sense modern : yet they are far from being it from the point of view of
their social function, where they appear as conservative in the best of cases, and more
often worse in the international context
24.
21 Ranabir Samaddar, “Dreams of the Colonised”, manuscript; by the same author: “The Last Hurrah
that Continues”, in Transeuropéennes 19/20, 2001, pp. 31-49; “The Destiny of a Translated Consti-
tutional Culture”, in Transeuropéennes 22, 2002, pp. 75-87;  “Utopia and Politics in Muslim
Bengal”, in Transeuropéennes 23, 2003, pp. 193-219.
22 Rada Ivekovic, Le sexe de la nation, Léo Scheer, Paris 2003; Dame Nation. Nation et différence
des sexes, Longo Editore, Ravenna 2003.
23 Samaddar, Ranabir, Those Accords. A Bunch of Documents, Kathmandu, South Asia Forum for Hu-
man Rights, Paper Series 4, 2000.
24 See Malcolm Spencer at the same conference, “Kulturelle Differenzierung in Musils Roman Der
Mann ohne Eigenschaften. Die Stadt B.”, whose presentation pushed my reflexion in this direction.
The same ideas are confirmed, concerning another example, in the paper by José M. Portillo Valdés,
“HOW CAN A MODERN HISTORY OF THE BASQUE COUNTRY MAKE SENSE?”  OP. CIT. Ivekovic: The Split of Reason and the Postcolonial Backlash, 9
The origin of the misunderstanding lies in a bad negotiation of the  relationship
between the universal and the particular, between the nation and its parts, and not at
all in the particular (culture, religion, indigenous people etc.) itself, and not in the
universal as such (“nation”, “state”). 
I have witnessed in the former Yugoslavia, in anticipation of its partition at the end
of the eighties (after Milosevic’s “coup d’Etat” in the Party in 1987 - Yugoslavia be-
ing a party state) and during its civil wars over the nineties, state-building exclusive,
aggressive and racist nationalisms and ethnocracies. Those nationalisms far from the
liberation independence-seeking post-colonial pattern, they are comparable to com-
munalism in India. They all addressed women as bearers of the nation and of sol-
diers. At the same time, the non-nationalist (and here, non-partition) resistance as
well as what was left of the Left, didn’t address them at all. Power – even as it
slipped out of hand - was not to be shared with women.
The question may also be how to inscribe in the nation a population whose exclusion
from it was the condition of the nation’s integration: that was the case in the Amer-
icas, settlers countries where the nations were formed without the people (the local
indigenous population) as a political agency, whether because these were extermin-
ated, or because they were colonized and completely subdued. In France, the popula-
tion of Moslem origin, even as many of them are secular or unconcerned by religion.
The problem is really economic, political and social at a time when the Welfare State
is rapidly been abandoned everywhere
25. 
Post-socialism and Post-colonialism compared
Not only do Socialism, Capitalism and Colonies belong to different forms of one and
the same Modernity producing different though interrelated, complementary and in-
tertwined conditions, but there are parallels to be drawn from that moment in con-
temporary history that marked the Turn (Wende), the moment from which on global-
isation (though an old process), became visible to all and hyper exposed: the year
1989, marking the end of the Cold War, of the official division of Europe, the com-
mon entrance into globalised neo-liberal history which also marked the end of the
simplistic controversy between Capitalism and Communism. The end of this dicho-
tomy, or of one of the partitions of reason enhanced many other partitions (including
state partitions such as in the former Yugoslavia), but that is a different question:
partitions always give rise to further partitions
26. I want to expose here the generally
shared sense (itself highly ideological) that “real Socialism” alone failed, while it
was clearly a more general failure – the failure of a division of reason, of a binary, in
25 Immanuel Wallerstein shows that the Welfare option, historically really a Liberal safety valve meant
to prevent or to defuse Socialist options, was meant to prevent the latter and to protect the Capital
from it, while, as a “lesser evil”, yielding to the “dangerous classes” in some calculated points. Its
objectives were comparable to those of Socialism, though “softer”. I. Wallerstein, After Liberalism,
The New Press, New York 1995, and other writings.
26 Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes & Rada Ivekovic (eds.), Divided Countries, Separated Cities. The
Modern Legacy of Partition, Delhi: OUP 2003. See the situation in Kosovo today, March 2004.Ivekovic: The Split of Reason and the Postcolonial Backlash, 10
this case expressed as the political Cold War divide East vs. West, Capitalism vs. So-
cialism, Good vs. Bad Guys etc. The partage de la raison is difficult to grasp, since
we are ourselves usually located within it. To “understand” it means basically that
not being in an objectal relationship, difference is not philosophically interesting as
an object, but it is – in its form that I call partage – the very shape and movement of
reason itself.
The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 started a major crisis in Third World countries
helped by the socialist ones. It is from that time on, from 1989 on, one could say from
a Post-Modernity identified of sorts, that the significant differences between what
was the former Socialist block and the countries independent after WW II sprang
up
27.
The Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia imploded and gave rise to a quantity of
new nationalisms, nations and states. The claim was in many cases that these were
liberation nationalisms equivalent to those in once colonised countries. But “nation-
alism” in India or in Algeria had and still has (relating to those times) a positive aura
(regardless of the price paid, we now know), while the same has become, for the new
Balkan nations, associated with ethnicism, communalism, communitarianism, racism
and ethnic cleansing. It is a matter of definition, nomination and standpoint, and the
situations are varied. Resorting to the term of “semi-colonialism” as is done by the
“Kakanien” scholars
28 may be practical but is theoretically unsatisfactory. I would
suggest two main traits in the definition of a colony which, in any case, is a brutally
physically exploited country - that a colony is a non-sovereign country (but any feder-
al or rather federated state is so too) with no state autonomy (but most free states
have lost that sovereignty today, and no autonomy can be absolute autarchy in any
case), where a population of a basically different origin is made subaltern to the met-
ropolis in terms of the order of bodies, of citizenship, freedom and rights, and cannot
travel freely to the centre; there are variations here between settlers and non-settlers
colonies. The inequality is institutionalised including some degree of  apartheid
between the ruling and the ruled. When the occupied country does have some politic-
al autonomy (as in non settlers colonies with Home rule), a colony would be the one
country with a separate and clearly subordinate status compared to main parts, and
physical oppression from the centre. If this is so, the definition of parts of the old em-
pires (Austro-Hungarian; Ottoman; Russian, Soviet, Russian “empire” again; Iberi-
an
29) as colonial states is partly problematic in the sense that different countries (usu-
ally neighbouring and with populations though foreign, at least familiar and known)
within the empire often have different statuses compared to a centre that diversely
keeps them at distance. A third element for a tentative definition of a colony as we
understand it today (but again, it is a matter of definition), is that modern colonies
27 Rada Ivekovic, “From the Nation to Partition; Through Partition to the Nation: Readings” in Glas-
son Deschaumes,  Ivekovic (eds.), op. cit. pp. 150-175.
28 www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/theorie
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usually have to do with, or start from, the accumulation due to industrialisation and
contribute to the construction of capitalism: European capitalism was historically fed
by colonialism, as much as it reconstructed the colonies in its turn as “premodern”
and closer to nature, providing raw material, thus paradoxically including slavery
(historically, an “older” formation) within the modern economy and legitimising the
“civilizing” mission. The consumption of goods from the colonies took place in the
colonising country, centre of power. We could nuance here, and decide that colonial-
ism has helped build other types of Modernity too, such as Socialism, and that asser-
tion would hold likewise, but we would then need to account for the differences
between these two kinds of “colonialism” (capitalist and socialist colonialism). Such
divisions belong to our conceptual apparatus rather than to what we deal with, which
in all events requires a case-by-case analysis. It is risky to apply exclusive definitions.
It is worthwhile, however, to test Samir Amin’s quite convincing inversion of the
roles played by colonialism and imperialism here, from the perspective of the peri-
pheries. According to him, it is capitalist imperialism, that developed colonialism as
its instrument
30. 
Regarding the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, neighbouring countries and
in some cases peoples historically linked to the political centre, received within the
federation relative state autonomy, or indeed got thereof their first and only stately
status. This was the case of Macedonia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, federal units with re-
cognised nation[hood] in (socialist) Yugoslavia. A case appearing more like colonial-
ism is that of Kosovo (underdeveloped compared to the rest of the country), where
the cultural and linguistic difference is felt more between Albanians and Slavs for
historic and in recent history mainly economic reasons. But the linguistic, and the
constructed ethnic, difference is certainly played out and escalated on both sides.
There is no doubt that Kosovo suffered repression within Serbia, unprotected by the
Federation. But again, Kosovo had, and especially so since 1974, stately autonomy,
its citizens had formally exactly the same rights as any other Yugoslavs. With some
other regions in Croatia, with Bosnia-Herzegovina etc., declared as an under-
developed region, Kosovo was also highly subsidised directly from federal funds.
(Another matter analysing and criticising how the subsidies were distributed and how
development was planned. Subsidies also reproduce subalternity.)
31
Colonisation is not one particular event in the past, but a natural tendency of stately
power to spread. This took many different forms of which some were historically
called “colonisation”, while the spreading itself actually had degrees, including dif-
ferent levels of brutality and violence. Colonialism is not a unique or separate phe-
nomenon, it is the dynamics of state-building as such. 
30 S. Amin, Le virus libéral. La guerre permanente et l’américanisation du monde, Le Temps des ce-
rises, Paris 2003, p. 40; only Maoism, he continues, understood the challenge! But that is another
question.
31 Ivekovic, Ivan, Ethnic and Regional Conflicts in Yugoslavia and Transcaucasia. A Political Eco-
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New nationalisms of the nineties in Europe are not libratory. Post-colonial studies
may not be useless to understand these too. There haven’t been forgotten European
colonialisms here, but its colonial heritage remains unquestioned. It is facing now the
making of the “New American Century”. New nationalist ethnocratic drives in East
Europe can be compared with West European separatist nationalisms, such as the
Basque one. After 1978, the Spanish “de-constitutionalisation” through largely dis-
tributed autonomies to provinces whose nationalists consider themselves colonized
by the Spaniards, produced various paradoxes, as shown by Bartolomé Clavero: “A
project  is  promoted  that  brims  over  its  own  authority  of  institutional
representation”
32, inasmuch as both the establishing principle and an established re-
gime are asserted in one and the same move while the tension between constituting
and constituted power is not resolved
33. The nationalist project, claiming response to
a colonialism, really de-empowers its people by a double-bind. “That there be a his-
toriography imagining a Basque people as a colonized subject over time and in the
present  seems  to  be  at  least  offensive  for  those  peoples  that  really  suffer
colonialism”, adds Clavero
34. The autonomy of the Basques, divided between France
and Spain within Europe, necessarily questions the latter’s making. Or the adherence
of a truncated Cyprus.
As NGOs in Skopje have a conference on Postcolonial critique and the Balkans in
2003, as the opposition Belgrade Circle publishes Subaltern and Post-colonial au-
thors, as the Centre for Women’s Studies in Zagreb teaches post-colonial literature
and movements, one can conclude to a suddenly growing interest for (post-)colonial
studies in the Balkans. Many there will now be “Subaltern” claiming to have been
colonised yesterday by one of the Yugoslav components, or today by the “West”.
Most have forgotten the non-aligned third-world policy of then Yugoslavia, showing
a non-contemporaneity of history and historiography. There is a gap and a postponed
remembrance here, a displaced recollection. Non-alignment was a boring official
discourse then. The real-socialist pattern was often abhorred though pride was taken
then in the Yugoslav resistance to Nazism and Stalinism, as much as the post-coloni-
al one was largely ignored. So the present belated recognition of a once existing
(state-cultivated!) and fundamentally neglected parentage has some traits of all the
“post-“: they execute a strange “loop” in time with a petitio principii in the “post-“.
Consciousness is oft belated, and received history may mask the many alternative
histories. The displacement / being out of place, or (e)migration, being stateless,
which is a general human condition but so palpable in situations of partitions and
32 Bartolomé Clavero, “Entre desahucio de fuero y quiebra de estatuto: Euskadi según el doble plan
del Lendkari”, in Revista de estudios politicos, abril-mayo 2003, p. 58. Portillo Valdés, op. cit.
33 The paradox appears in the Additional Disposition of the Autonomy Statutes of  the Basque Coun-
try or Euskadi: “La aceptación del régimen de autonomia que se establece en el presente Estatuto no
implica renuncia del Pueblo Vasco a los derechos que como tal le hubieran podido corresponder en
virtud de su historia, que podrán ser actualizados de acuerdo con lo que establezca el ordenamiento
jurídico.” Ibid, p. 46.
34 Ibid, p. 73, n. see also his book : Clavero, Genocidio y justicia. La Destrucción de las Indias, ayer
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wars, was recognised by the Balkans only when it happened here – i.e. 50 after the
South Asian example, in spite of the former non-aligned ideology. No-one else’s life
can feel as real as our own. But various contemporary nationalisms, fundamental-
isms rely on post-colonial discourses of other times, and trick their public. A narra-
tion is linked to a space, or “translates a space into a place
35”, utopia into topos. Non-
aligned citizens had no narrative field for the concept of “partition” until its meaning
sprang up through “their” own bodies, territory, culture and identity. It is in a way
when it lost a territory (the Yugoslav space) and its referent other, the “non-aligned”,
that the non-nationalist opposition earned itself a narrative field for post-colonial
imagination. The post-colonial text is now the deviation of “our” own unconscious.
There is a paradox here, since the strategy of anti-colonial and anti-imperial resist-
ance is structured by the wish to reshuffle the relationship to the other through a
translation of the past or of the unconscious into a new common narrative field, yet
avoiding binaries; which also means reconstructing the hegemony as all the players
in the game are being replaced. 
One could argue that land conquered by Empires, in the European case neighbouring
countries, are forgotten “colonialisms”. It is a matter of convention but it is not philo-
sophically challenging. Such a decision, whether to encompass or not such cases into
the description of colonialism – is itself necessarily located, a matter informed ideo-
logically, and this is itself part of the partage de la raison. There are many common
elements with colonialism here, and many others that aren’t. It’s a matter of nomina-
tion. See for example the “matriochka” (Chinese boxes) form of Russian unity
36 all
through the empire throughout the Soviet Union & back to Russia which is still an
empire of sorts: to the contrary of other colonialisms, the annexed peoples have here
in their turn in some ways become co-founders of the central (Russian, then Soviet)
identity as much as the latter formed them
37. The settlers have often, though not al-
ways, been absorbed into local elites in “Eurasia”, building through them a cohesion
with the centre. Today, after the crumbling of the Soviet regime, it is the local elites
in newly independent states, that in many cases never asked for independence (unlike
Chechnia), who took over maintaining what seems to be an uninterrupted continuity
of power since the Tsar. Can one speak of colonialism here in the same sense as in
other cases? Or of inner colonialism? K. Theweleit called the subordination of wo-
men “inner colonialism”. The way in which large territories East and South of Russia
were annexed, absorbed, integrated, maintained attached to the centre must be stud-
ied. 
35 Sanjay Chaturvedi, “The Excess of Geopolitics: Partition of ‘British India’”, in: S. Bianchini, S.
Chaturvedi, R. Ivekovic, R. Samaddar, PARTITIONS. Reshaping States and Minds , Frank Cass,
(forthcoming 2005).
36 Stefano Bianchini, “Partitions – Categories and Destinies”, in: S. Bianchini, S. Chaturvedi, R.
Ivekovic, R. Samaddar, PARTITIONS. Reshaping States and Minds, op. cit
37 Michael Thuman, La Puissance russe. Un  puzzle à reconstituer?, Alvik, Paris 2003, mentioned in :
Sylvie Braibant, “Impuissance et émancipation de la Russie” in Le Monde diplomatique, January
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Self-determination, Lenin’s and Woodrow Wilson’s idea, seen later by two blocks as
the balance of power, was also to be the basis of post-colonialism and of “non-align-
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